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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we argue that Samuel Pufendorf’s works on natural law contain a sentimentalist 
theory of morality that is Smithian in its moral psychology. Pufendorf’s account of how 
ordinary people make moral judgements and come to act sociably is surprisingly similar to 
Smith’s. Both thinkers maintain that the human desire for esteem, manifested by resentment 
and gratitude, informs people of the content of central moral norms and can motivate them 
to act accordingly. Finally, we suggest that given Pufendorf’s theory of socially imposed 
moral entities, he has all the resources for a sentimentalist theory of morality. 
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Samuel Pufendorf’s connection to Adam Smith and other authors of the Scottish 
Enlightenment has become a subject of growing interest among philosophers and intellectual 
historians. Smith’s explicit references might be few but he was deeply familiar with 
Pufendorf’s works on natural law, which were a staple of law and philosophy curricula in 
Scottish universities at the time.1 In recent years, stimulating research has emerged on the 
affinities between the two thinkers: Knud Haakonssen (2004, 96−97) argues that Hobbes’s 
and Pufendorf’s radical view of morality as an artificial and conventionalist phenomenon 
prepared the way for Hume and Smith. Istvan Hont (2015, 33) maintains that Smith’s analysis 
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of the historical development of socio-political organizations borrowed Pufendorf’s 
presupposition that the self-regarding basis of human motivation and sociability are not 
diametrically opposed but complementary. Arild Saether (2017) shows how Smith used 
Pufendorf's ideas in his political economy. 
Owing to this welcome trend in scholarship, the similarity between Pufendorf’s 
and Smith’s moral psychological views is also gradually being recognized. However, the role 
of the human desire for esteem in Pufendorf’s natural law theory remains unexplored.2 The 
contribution of this article is to bring this desire and its relationship to morality into focus. 
By ‘desire for esteem’ we mean a basic emotional need to be positively noticed by others. It 
is a passion for approval as such, hardwired in human nature. For Pufendorf and Smith alike, 
we will argue, desire for esteem is reflected in the content of key moral norms and accounts 
for people’s motivation to comply with them. Moreover, we will suggest that Pufendorf has 
all the resources for building a sentimentalist moral theory around the psychological views 
he shares with Smith.  
Pufendorf’s account of how people in practice judge of morals and can come 
to act accordingly is surprisingly like Smith’s. Still, one must not overlook the arguably deep 
difference between their respective moral theories. Pufendorf is a natural law theorist who 
aims to demonstrate the content of divinely imposed laws while Smith seeks to describe and 
explain moral phenomena in naturalistic terms. In his major work De jure naturae et gentium, 
and its textbook version De officio hominis et civis, Pufendorf grounds morality in the will 
of God, who commands everyone to ‘cultivate and maintain peaceable sociality (socialitas) 
as much as he can’ (JNG 2.3.15/PWSP 152).3 In turn, Smith’s moral theory provided in The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments is sentimentalist in that our emotional responses – from a certain 
privileged viewpoint – are constitutive of moral qualities (TMS III.5.5).4 Moreover, their 
normative positions differ accordingly in that Smith stresses appropriate motives instead of 
conforming one’s behaviour to a law.  
Pufendorf’s divine command theory is apt to conceal the more constructive 
aspects he sees in human nature. However, this paper shows that Pufendorf is far from 
maintaining that human emotions, or passions, are a mere threat to sociability and hence 
something to be controlled by law. On the contrary, we argue, Pufendorf agrees with Smith 
that the desire for esteem 1) provides people with the content of central moral norms 2) and 
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can move people to act in accordance with moral norms. Pufendorf and Smith are especially 
attentive to desire for esteem in the form of gratitude and resentment: the reactive attitudes 
explain how people judge each other’s conduct and come to modify their own. 
Showing the ways in which desire for esteem is conducive to morality 
obviously does not by itself establish Pufendorf as a proto-sentimentalist. By sentimentalism, 
we mean a metaethical view that takes moral qualities to be constituted by human judgements 
which either are or have their basis in emotional responses. However, our claims gain further 
relevance when considered against the backdrop of Pufendorf’s theory of moral entities. The 
fundamental moral norms might be comprised of the divinely imposed natural law, but 
people are capable of imposing further moral entities onto the physical world. These include 
‘moral sensible qualities’, such as honour and disgrace (JNG I.1.21). Indeed, the majority of 
moral entities are imposed by people themselves. We suggest that when Pufendorf’s 
psychological views concerning moral judgement and motivation are placed within this part 
of his moral ontology, one finds nothing less than a sentimentalist account of moral 
phenomena. Given the centrality of reactive attitudes and its understanding of moral 
motivation, the account foreshadows Smithian sentimentalism in particular as opposed to the 
other eighteenth-century varieties by Hutcheson and Hume. 
 The paper unfolds as follows. Section one shows how self-esteem manifests 
itself in the passions of resentment and gratitude. In Pufendorf, these passions are connected 
to the perfect duty to grant others simple esteem and to the imperfect duty of charity whereas 
Smith explicitly accounts for the virtues of justice and beneficence with them. Section two 
investigates how, in Pufendorf’s theory, the desire for esteem can contribute to sociable 
conduct that is required by the law of nature. Section three, finally, concentrates on the 
complex relationship between esteem and moral motivation in Smith that bears an interesting 
resemblance to some less explicit notions at work in Pufendorf’s writings. It is of particular 
interest how Smith develops his account of esteem-seeking further by distinguishing between 
the desires for praise, merited praise, and praise-worthiness.  
 
 
1. Resentment and gratitude 
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Pufendorf’s and Smith’s emphasis on resentment and gratitude – emotions known as reactive 
attitudes in contemporary discussions5 – brings their moral psychological views particularly 
close to one another. In what follows, we show that both thinkers see reactive attitudes as 
essential constituents of social life and analyse them as expressions of the desire for esteem. 
Moreover, because of the way in which moral norms reflect these attitudes, enabling people’s 
self-esteem turns out to be their main content. 
Pufendorf does not articulate a systematic or comprehensive theory of human 
psychology anywhere. A close examination of his writings reveals, nonetheless, that 
Pufendorf is attentive to the functioning of resentment and gratitude. He explains that human 
beings are equipped with ‘a very delicate self-esteem’ (sui aestimatio), that is, they naturally 
have an emotional need for maintaining a recognized status as human beings in the eyes of 
others. The term ‘man’ (homine) carries a certain dignity. People therefore naturally respond 
to insults that deny their humanity by replying: ‘I am not a dog or beast, but as much a man 
as you’. It is noteworthy that, in these instances the human being ‘is usually no less, but in 
fact more upset’ than if someone damages his body or property. (JNG 3.2.1/PWSP 159)  
Self-esteem tends to animate exacerbated and unsocial reactions. Pufendorf’s 
awareness of the unsocial effects of self-esteem leads to the conviction that despite the 
dissimilarity of natural capabilities among individuals, every person must avoid displaying 
pride and must treat others as their natural equals in order to maintain peace. The duty to 
regard others as naturally equal thus follows from the need to pacify the resentment produced 
by self-esteem (Saastamoinen 2010, 55−62). Moreover, natural law obliges us to treat others 
as natural equals and to grant others simple esteem (existimatio simplex), that is, to treat 
others as morally capable actors unless their actions prove otherwise or civil law reduces 
their simple esteem.6 One is obligated to grant simple esteem to strangers even when one 
does not have proof of their aptitude to cultivate sociability (JNG VIII.4.2).    
Stephen Darwall (2012, 224) has argued that Pufendorf’s theory ‘will face the 
problem that taking a sociable attitude towards others, that is, regarding them as having 
legitimate claims on us owing to a dignity that is grounded in their rational and social 
“nature,” is arguably not the kind of thing that can be done in obedience to anyone else’s 
legitimate demands, not even God’s.’ According to Darwall, we may treat others sociably 
only through appreciating their social nature. It should be noted, however, that in Pufendorf’s 
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model the quantity of esteem always hinges on the contextually arising demands of 
sociability.7 It is one of his basic assumptions that the variable amount of moral esteem 
among persons is necessary for the accomplishment of a tranquil social order in large-scale 
societies. People cannot demand simple esteem from others owing to the dignity of their own 
nature. The demand to esteem others as good men, until otherwise proved, is grounded in the 
will of God that obliges humans to act in a way that is necessary for maintaining a peaceful 
social life.8  
Pufendorf’s interest in the effects of the desire for esteem is mainly political. 
The social consequences of self-esteem become a pressing issue because of the number of 
individuals who are naturally disposed to abuse others. Many individuals are equipped with 
‘petulance’ (petulantia), that is, ‘a passion for insulting others,’ inclining them to insult and 
harm other people. In turn, others ‘cannot fail to be offended and to gird themselves to resist, 
however restrained their natural temper, in order to preserve and protect their persons and 
their liberty’. (OHC I.3.4/DMC 34–35) People naturally experience resentment and react 
with violence to insults lowering their esteem in social life; in Pufendorf’s words, the sign of 
contempt ‘vigorously excites the hearts of others to violent anger and desire for revenge’. In 
fact, many individuals ‘would prefer to expose their lives to instant danger, to say nothing of 
disturbing the public peace, rather than let an insult go unavenged’. (I.7.6/63)  As it turns out, 
self-esteem may even override the natural inclination to self-preservation and the fear of 
death. 
Pufendorf’s aim is to argue that the minimal conditions of mutual trust 
necessary for sociability in large-scale societies would be utterly destroyed without satisfying 
the need for esteem of its members. He notes that when forbidding duels, the magistrates 
ought to take care to impose punishments on citizens who disgracefully insult others, or ‘to 
give a cuff on the ear’. This is necessary for the prevention of vengeful acts. Because of the 
‘custom in civil life’, Pufendorf does not consider it realistic to demand that people tame their 
self-esteem and endure insults that greatly lower their esteem (JNG II.5.12/LNNO 281–282).   
Pufendorf focuses more on how to confine the resentful effects of self-esteem 
than on how the passion of gratitude may promote sociability. Nevertheless, he acknowledges 
that charitable actions are able to generate feelings of gratitude in a person receiving a benefit 
that, in turn, nurtures reciprocal sociability. Merely to grant others the esteem to which they 
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have a perfect right eliminates ‘the just cause for hatred’ whereas ‘something good must also 
be conferred on the other’ to foster mutual sociability among individuals (JNG III.3.1/PWSP 
164). The performance of perfect duties is not in itself enough for a smoothly functioning 
social life. People should therefore engage in numerous generous actions coming under the 
heading of imperfect duties. Pufendorf adapts the language of Hugo Grotius in distinguishing 
between perfect and imperfect duties and correlative rights, and dividing the effects of ‘moral 
power’ into either perfect or imperfect. Perfect duties (e.g., civil laws and contracts) are 
always specifically defined and their performance can be compelled by force. In contrast, 
imperfect rights (e.g., charity) cannot be defended either by legal authority or by means of 
war. (JNG I.1.19–20) 
Although Pufendorf does not explain in detail the psychological process 
involved in the practices of imperfect duties, his discussion implies that a giver’s emotional 
attitude towards a beneficiary plays a vital role. Pufendorf’s reflection on charity is marked 
by references to Seneca’s De Beneficiis. Like Seneca, Pufendorf acknowledges the 
importance of handling gift-giving situations so that the passion of gratitude can promote 
sociability (Harpman 2004, 26). The importance of imperfect duties lies exactly in their 
power to promote gratitude. The acts need to have a non-compulsory character ‘since things 
which may be extorted by force have no such power to win the hearts of others, as those 
which may be denied without fear’ (JNG III.4.6/LNNO 386). It is important to note that 
pretended altruism is sufficient for Pufendorf. 9 He does not claim that the giver must perform 
the duties of humanity for altruistic reasons. Rather, Pufendorf emphasizes that others have 
to perceive the giver’s action as altruistic (OHC I.8.8/DMC 66–67).  
The reason for this is that people experience gratitude and approve beneficent 
acts only when they take them as signs of benevolence. The person performing a charitable 
act does not have a perfect right to claim gratitude from the beneficiary. Nonetheless, 
Pufendorf argues that by failing to show gratitude one ‘reveals oneself as unworthy of the 
judgement which another man had made of one’s sense of honour; and to let it be seen that 
one cannot be moved to conceive a sense of humanity by benefits which soften even beasts’ 
(OHC 1.8.8/DMC 66). While the passion of gratitude per se is morally indifferent without 
the commands of natural law, it forms an important source of motivation for the promotion 
of sociability.10  
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Pufendorf’s discussion of perfect duties and imperfect duties makes frequent 
references to resentment and gratitude. Smith, for his part, grounds the equivalent virtues of 
justice and beneficence in the self-same passions. Smith’s unique account of moral qualities 
relies on people’s sympathetic capacities11 and the stable viewpoint of a spectator (a person 
uninvolved but attentively observing). Accordingly, an action has merit if its motive would 
raise gratitude in a spectator who is attending to the situation of the person affected by the 
action. Beneficence is about performing meritorious acts. Correspondingly, justice is about 
refraining from acts with demerit, that is, acts that raise the spectator’s vicarious resentment. 
People performing such actions are ‘proper’ objects of gratitude and resentment in Smith’s 
sense of the term.12 Since resentment involves a desire to punish, and gratitude a desire to 
reward, punishment and reward are also appropriate to the extent that a spectator is apt to 
share these passions.13 (TMS II.i.2.1–3)  
Smith’s way of establishing the rules of justice and the ideal of beneficence by 
relying on appropriate, passionate responses is the reverse of Pufendorf’s divine command 
model. Instead of somehow referring to the goal of natural law, the maintenance of 
sociability, Smith derives, for instance, the normative notion of injury from the spectators’ 
sympathy with the victim’s natural, harm-based resentment (TMS II.ii.1.5). However, Smith 
is just as keenly aware of the large-scale effects of resentment and gratitude as Pufendorf is. 
He points out that beneficence is necessary to make a society flourishing and happy by tying 
its members together with reciprocal love and gratitude, although a society can subsist in a 
tolerable state without this virtue. The case of justice is different since the prevalence of 
injustice would destroy society at once. Smith claims that if the members of society began 
hurting one another at will, this would lead to ‘mutual resentment and animosity’ and all the 
bonds of society would be broken at once. (II.ii.3.3) 
In Smith’s view then, every state is under the necessity to enforce the virtue of 
justice through positive laws in order to avoid the ‘bloodshed and disorder’ that would ensue 
from every man revenging himself ‘whenever he fancied he was injured’ (TMS VII.iv.36). 
However, it is not awareness of this necessity that explains why we disapprove of certain acts 
as unjust and regard punishing people for these acts as legitimate. This point constitutes 
Smith’s main criticism of Hume’s theory of justice (see Pack and Schliesser 2006). Sympathy 
with the general happiness in a society cannot, Smith maintains, account for the relevant 
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responses that are actually much less reflective. (II.ii.3.4–9) Besides this, Smith claims that 
Hume gets the phenomenology wrong: the passions we feel when we or others are 
intentionally benefited or harmed are different from our sentiments concerning useful and 
harmful objects (II.ii.3.10─11; IV.2.1─4).14 Thus, Smith would agree with Pufendorf’s 
previous remark that simply conferring some benefit is far from sufficient to ‘win the hearts 
of others’.  
The ‘negative’ character of justice that Smith highlights (TMS II.ii.1.9) results 
in a notable difference between the virtues of justice and beneficence. Since justice concerns 
refraining from acts that are properly resented it not only should be enforced but can be 
enforced successfully. On the contrary, beneficent acts − the proper objects of gratitude − 
require a benevolent motive. We think that Smith’s point about enforceability accounts well 
for Pufendorf’s struggles with the imperfect duties: Pufendorf is aware that these duties 
cannot be fulfilled without at least the appearance of the right kind of motive because the 
relevant, sociability-promoting effects are linked to genuine gratitude. 
 In section three, we will see what relevance one’s concern for other people’s 
moral judgement has with respect to acting virtuously and, in particular, to acting justly. 
What we want to emphasize here is how the passions of resentment and gratitude exemplify 
the weight individuals put on other people’s attitudes towards them. Smith provides a rich 
description of the objects of resentment and gratitude in TMS II.iii.1. He begins by noting 
that mere pain associated with an object, like stumbling on a stone, can raise a passing 
resentment towards it. There are, however, many other conditions that an object must meet 
for the resentment to be complete. For instance, the object of resentment must be capable of 
feeling pain and pleasure so that it can be punished. The harm must also be caused 
intentionally and with a motive that the sufferer disapproves of. This enables the complete 
satisfaction of resentment and provides an additional cause for it.  
 Smith maintains that the chief cause of resentment and gratitude, in their full 
form, is the attitude displayed by the person causing the harm or benefit rather than the 
consequences of these actions themselves. Further, the ultimate object of recompense or 
revenge is to maintain or change the attitude in question:  
 
9 
 
What most of all charms us in our benefactor, is the concord between his 
sentiments and our own, with regard to what interests us so nearly as the worth 
of our own character, and the esteem that is due to us. We are delighted to find a 
person who values us as we value ourselves, and distinguishes us from the rest 
of mankind, with an attention not unlike that with which we distinguish 
ourselves. To maintain in him these agreeable and flattering sentiments, is one of 
the chief ends proposed by the returns we are disposed to make to him. (TMS 
II.iii.1.4) 
 
Likewise, our resentment towards someone is triggered by his self-preference and ‘the little 
account which he seems to make of us.’ By punishing the wrongdoer, we attempt to make 
him sensible ‘that the person whom he injured did not deserve to be treated in that manner’. 
(TMS II.iii.1.5) Smith slides in the latter clause from the injured party’s sense of what is due 
to him into what a spectator feels is due to that person, but exactly the same considerations 
and aims are reflected in the spectators’ sympathetic passion. To put it simply, gratitude and 
resentment are responses to the esteem that others seem to have for us and involve a desire 
to strengthen that esteem ─ or give rise to it when it is lacking. Smith’s analysis of resentment 
also clarifies why he thinks that a just person must abstain from much more than causing 
bodily or material harm to others. For instance, a serious lack in the virtue of chastity or 
veracity can be a proper cause of resentment and hence an instance of injustice 
(VII.iv.18─22). 
 For Pufendorf and Smith, awareness of being esteemed by others is a basic 
emotional need that displays itself in natural reactive attitudes. Pufendorf claims that people 
are often more enraged at each other because of insults than due to physical harm or material 
losses. Smith goes further in maintaining that even in cases like receiving a material 
advantage or suffering bodily harm gratitude and resentment are mainly responsive to the 
esteem or lack of it implied by the other’s act. According to both thinkers then, desire for 
esteem can be a stronger motive than the concerns of self-preservation. Smith’s depiction of 
gratitude interestingly implies that the pleasure of being esteemed by others is tied to self-
approval. We come back to this notion in the last section, but turn first to consider the 
beneficial effects of esteem-seeking in Pufendorf.   
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2. Pufendorf on the desire for intensive esteem and sociability 
 
We have shown how Pufendorf’s account of resentment and gratitude reveals his awareness 
of how our affective attitudes toward the behaviour of others operate and how their attitudes 
move our passions in turn. Next, we seek to demonstrate how the desire for esteem motivates 
people to act in accordance with the natural law of sociability. What interests us is 
Pufendorf’s social and psychological remarks on how the norms of sociability guide actions 
in social life. This is not to deny that he has a theory of how individuals are capable of being 
internally obligated by natural law.15 Nevertheless, Pufendorf acknowledges that appropriate 
emotional reactions are a crucial factor in the fulfilment of the basic natural law edict of 
living sociably. The way to sociability in large-scale societies is not individuals rationally 
recognizing the divinely imposed natural norms but socially controlled and shaped passions. 
For instance, the condemnation of unsociable acts from childhood on develops through the 
process of education ‘to the strength of natural passion’ (JNG I.2.6). Habitual behaviour 
develops into virtues or vices, which have instrumental value insofar as they promote 
sociability (I.4.6).16  
 According to our interpretation, emotional responses to social experience, 
rather than an internal sense of obligation, are what in fact motivate actions in accord with 
natural law. The same point about effectiveness applies to natural benevolence: although 
Pufendorf does not regard all human actions as expressions of self-interest, he thinks that our 
concern for the wellbeing of others is very feeble and not sufficient for performing the 
benevolent actions demanded by natural law.17 It is the desire for esteem that forms the 
central component in Pufendorf’s idea of social interaction as a device that modifies human 
motivations and actually makes sociability possible. In maintaining and elevating their 
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esteem, individuals come to internalize moral norms. Moral conduct is thus a socialized 
product of a particular society and desire for esteem plays an important part in this process.  
According to Pufendorf, we not only strive to maintain our simple esteem but 
also seek to intensify our esteem compared to others. Like many of his contemporaries, he 
notes that performing a deed that elevates the agent’s esteem is accompanied by joy. The 
human being is an animal ‘conceited about his own excellence and finds the greatest pleasure 
if he can discover in himself such things as will enable him to distinguish himself above 
others, and to boast’ (JNG I.2.7/LNNO 31). For example, parents’ concern about the success 
of their children is not principally due to the natural affection towards their offspring, but 
arises ‘because they think that it constitutes glory for them to have brought them into the 
world’. As we have already seen, the joy arising from the desire for esteem may override 
one’s inclination to self-preservation. For instance, the Japanese commit ceremonial suicide 
because of ‘the boasting of friendship and love, and the glory derived from it’. (II.3.14/206) 
Besides joy and sadness, desire for esteem is manifest in bodily reactions. Pufendorf notes 
that things lowering our esteem in the eyes of others cause involuntary blushing, ‘not, indeed, 
in the sight of man in general, but of those, whose esteem we especially desire’ (I.2.7/32). 
The claim that we naturally strive for the possession of higher esteem than 
others was, of course, familiar to Pufendorf through the writings of Thomas Hobbes, who 
links the question of the desire for esteem in social life to the pursuit of ‘glory’, the joy of 
superiority.18 Following Hobbes, Pufendorf acknowledges that self-loving individuals do not 
predominantly intermingle with others in order to seek friendship for its own sake but honour 
and utility (JNG II.3.18; VII.1.2). While animals cannot compare themselves to others, 
between human beings there is ‘a struggle for honour and dignity’, which is the root cause 
for ‘the envy, rivalry and hatred’ amongst individuals (VII.2.4/LNNO 969).  Pufendorf, like 
Hobbes, worries that excessive desire for esteem threatens the stability of political 
associations and eventually leads to social conflict and a state of war. Institutional control of 
people’s civil esteem by the sovereign is therefore necessary for the maintenance of 
sociability.  
However, Pufendorf does not treat the desire for esteem merely as a further 
cause of antisocial conduct but maintains that it forms one the central motivational 
underpinnings of the development of sociability. He introduces the concept of intensive 
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esteem (existimatio intensive), differing from ‘simple esteem’, as a further measure to 
differentiate the value of persons who are equal with respect to their simple esteem or civil 
esteem. Pufendorf conceives of honour as a kind of social recognition of a person’s intensive 
esteem. Honour that ‘corresponds to various degrees of esteem’ arises from the imposition 
of other people. It is ‘an expression of our judgement of another man’s excellence’. (JNG 
VIII.4.11/LNNO 1241) Pufendorf explicitly comments on Hobbes’s discussion of honour, 
accepting the Hobbesian notion that ‘glory and honour consist of comparison and pre-
eminence’ (JNG VIII.4.11/LNNO 1241). Pufendorf admits that ‘the foundations of honour 
may justly be reduced to power, in so far as they naturally produce some effect in human life’ 
(VIII.4.13/1246). Nonetheless, he is reluctant to accept Hobbes’s statement in chapter 10 of 
Leviathan that honour consists only in the esteem of power.19 By this definition, Pufendorf 
claims, Hobbes reduces ‘all the foundations of honour or intensive esteem to power which is 
defined as the possession of present means to obtain in all likelihood some good’ 
(VIII.4.13/1245).  
Why does Pufendorf want to distinguish his definition of honour from 
Hobbes’s? Whereas Hobbes has no problem basing practices of honour on fear, Pufendorf 
claims that fear provoked by power is not an expression of voluntary honour. Though external 
practices of honour in civil societies may result from political coercion, Pufendorf argues, 
‘the respect which is forced from a man by the power of sovereignty, is a sign not of any real 
honour for him, but a fear of death.’ Accordingly, ‘the mere external signs of honour unless 
they arise from the submission of the mind are empty things’. (JNG VIII.4.14/LNNO 1249) 
An individual grants honour because he recognizes some ‘outstanding excellence in another 
and voluntarily submits to him for that reason’ (VIII.4.14/1248). 
Pufendorf thus distinguishes between power, which ‘signifies the power to 
injure others’ and excellence that deserves ‘to attract true veneration’. Whereas the latter 
involves ‘certain affection’, the former is associated with hatred. (JNG VIII.4.18/LNNO 
1253) By differentiating the external practices of honour from the foundations of intensive 
esteem, Pufendorf is able to maintain that the competition for intensive esteem and honour is 
not just a potential source of social conflict. Individuals should seek intensive esteem and 
corresponding honour by deeds ‘agreeable with reason, and looking to the good of human 
society, and as it opens the way to the performance of such’ (II.4.9/242). 
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We claim that the distinction between the external practices of honour 
commanded by civil laws and honour based on a person’s intensive esteem plays a 
profoundly important role in Pufendorf’s theory of sociability. The noteworthy difference 
from Hobbes is that Pufendorf’s theory leaves more room for the sphere of intensive esteem 
independent of the will of the sovereign (JNG VIII.4.24). However, there is extensive textual 
evidence suggesting that Pufendorf thinks that the uneducated majority of humankind is 
incapable of measuring the esteem of others according to the decrees of natural law. Only a 
few individuals ‘are blessed with the kind of natural disposition that enables them to perceive 
on their own what is permanently advantageous to humankind and individuals’. In practice, 
most people judge others based on spontaneous, self-regarding responses, rather than 
rationally imposed moral assessments. (VII.1.10/PWSP 208) 
Pufendorf holds that social interaction is a more realistic remedy for the 
negative consequences of the excessive desire for esteem than individual rationality. While 
the multitude is not always able to accurately measure the moral esteem of other people, all 
individuals who naturally desire intensive esteem in society are motivated to behave sociably 
towards others. Although an individual’s esteem may be raised because of some natural 
capacity, such as cleverness of the mind, his esteem is heightened ‘most of all by worthy 
accomplishments’ (JNG VIII.4.12/LNNO 1243). Actions in conformity with moral laws 
‘tend to maintain and increase a man’s honour, esteem, and dignity’ and increase his 
happiness (II.3.10). Indeed, the duties of humanity ‘are the fittest material for winning a 
reputation if duly governed by magnanimity and good sense’ (OHC I.8.5/DMC 65). It is clear 
evidence of man’s social nature that ‘every good man takes the greatest delight in 
distinguishing himself among his fellows by worthy deeds’ (JNG II.3.15/LNNO 209). These 
remarks display that interaction between esteem seekers is not necessarily a threat to 
Pufendorfian sociability but that it generates sociable conduct and makes individuals capable 
of participating in social life.  
            
 
       3. Praise, blame, and moral motivation in Smith 
 
14 
 
One of the core elements in Pufendorf’s theory is that though morality is instituted by God 
and can be demonstrated by reason, people internalize moral norms through interpersonal 
relations. The desire for esteem forms the central component in Pufendorf’s idea of social 
interaction as a device that modifies human motivations and actually makes sociability 
possible. We think that Smith’s views on what we will call ‘moral motivation’ bear a strong 
resemblance to Pufendorf’s suggestion. By moral motivation, we mean the motives 
individuals have for attempting to comply with moral norms. Smith holds that our explicit 
efforts to avoid vice and strive for virtue stem from a group of related desires that all 
somehow refer to evaluations made by others. Moral motivation is thus intricately connected 
with the desire for esteem. While Pufendorf recognizes, for instance, that people want esteem 
especially from those whose judgement they value, his psychological theory lacks the 
resources to do justice to the variety of desires connected to esteem. By distinguishing 
between the viewpoints of agents and spectators, combined with complex patterns of the 
imagination, Smith is able to construct a much more nuanced account. This attentiveness to 
the imaginative capacities sets Smith’s understanding of human nature apart from 
Pufendorf’s. 
 Before moving on to the psychology of moral motivation, it is important to 
discuss the relationship between moral motivation and virtuous action. Moral motivation in 
our sense of the term can be contrasted with natural emotions that do not require awareness 
of moral norms or ideals.20 According to Smith, specific natural emotions are necessary for 
various virtuous acts. For instance, with the virtue of beneficence the act must be motivated 
by love (TMS III.5.1). Moral motivation can help one cultivate one’s natural affections and 
avoid blameable neglect, but it cannot be the motive of a beneficent act. The negative virtue 
of justice, however, allows moral motivation to play a more direct role. 
Like Pufendorf, Smith holds that there is no natural passion, such as universal 
benevolence, that would stop us from hurting a stranger when our own interest is at stake 
(TMS III.3.4).21 Instead, he relies on moral motivation to account for the fact that people can 
abstain from unjust acts even in the absence of positive legislation. By grounding all moral 
worth in spectatorial judgements, Smith avoids the tensions that Pufendorf encounters in his 
attempts to combine the demands of natural law with an accurate understanding of evaluative 
attitudes. For Smith, feigning kind affections does not amount to virtuous beneficence, but 
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he finds a legitimate place for esteem-related motives in just acts and in the cultivation of 
one’s character. 
 The moral motives that allow people to abstain from blameworthy acts and 
cultivate virtue are all connected to self-directed moral sentiments, that is, to pride and shame 
over one’s mental characteristics and conduct. Smith maintains that thinking highly of 
oneself is agreeable and thinking meanly of oneself is disagreeable to an even greater extent. 
The thought of our own virtue is not only a source of tranquillity but elevates one ‘with secret 
triumph of mind’. Correspondingly, the thought of our vice torments and casts us down. 
(TMS III.1.7; IV.2.12; VI.iii.22) In fact, the complex emotion of remorse, involving shame, 
self-hatred, grief and fear, is ‘the most dreadful’ of all human sentiments (II.ii.2.3).22 
A person’s evaluative sentiments about herself result from adopting the 
viewpoint that some other person has or could have towards her. Smith’s psychological 
account of self-evaluation is thus based on the imaginative tendencies that underlie sympathy. 
In Smith’s words, all self-evaluation must bear ‘some secret reference, either to what are, or 
to what, upon a certain condition, would be, or to what, we imagine, ought to be the judgment 
of others’ (TMS III.1.2). The interpersonal element is not just a result of our psychologies 
but a necessary feature of the phenomenology of pride or shame (IV.2.12). Pufendorf’s 
emphasis on interpersonal comparisons is likewise built into the social nature of pride and 
shame as Smith conceives it. For example, receiving praise requires displaying exceptionally 
good qualities because people praise others for uncommon and hence surprising degrees of 
propriety (I.i.5.6−10). 
By relying on human nature’s imaginative tendencies, Smith is able to further 
develop Pufendorf’s scattered remarks about what kind of esteem and whose esteem we 
particularly long for. Accordingly, Smith makes a distinction between three related desires 
(TMS III.2; VII.ii.4.8–10) that correspond to three different means of maintaining pleasant 
self-approval.23 First, there is vanity: the desire for praise and aversion to blame without 
qualifications. Lastly, at the other end of the spectrum, there is desire for praise-worthiness 
and aversion to blame-worthiness, which result from the workings of conscience. Smith 
further characterizes these latter as 
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 … desire of possessing those qualities, and performing those actions, which we 
love and admire in other people; and in the dread of possessing those qualities, 
and performing those actions, which we hate and despise in other people. 
(TMS III.2.32) 
 
The curious notion of what ‘ought to be the judgment of others’ in TMS III.1.2 is explained 
here in naturalistic terms as referring to the agent’s own sentiments when imagining herself 
in an impartial position or to her awareness of previous sentiments when evaluating others 
from such a position. A person adopting this viewpoint of a fictional, uninvolved spectator 
is exercising her conscience (TMS III.2.32, III.3.1). 
Smith proposes that people who strive to act according to some moral norm are 
often driven by a third, intermediate motive: the desire for merited praise and aversion to 
merited blame (TMS III.2.8; VII.ii.4.8−10). This motive is a sort of mixture of the two other 
desires (III.2.26, 28−29). Smith’s core idea is that someone else’s opinion delights or 
mortifies the agent just insofar as she comes to share the attitude in question. Hence, since 
one’s own spectatorial judgements are apt to influence imaginative self-examination and 
taking the viewpoint of actual others happens readily as well, the desire for merited praise is 
a common motive.  
 All of the above motives – more particularly, the fear of being resented, the fear 
of merited resentment, and the fear of meriting resentment – can make one abstain from an 
unjust act no matter how limited we suppose benevolence to be (TMS III.3.4). None of the 
three motives raises resentment in spectators and only the first one implies some moral 
deficiency or folly (III.2.4). In fact, Smith claims, the three approval-seeking desires match 
perfectly with the morally charged everyday notions of vanity, desire for true glory, and love 
of virtue. Only ‘splenetic philosophers’ such as Mandeville lump all these together under 
vanity. (III.2.8, III.2.25–27, VII.ii.4.8–10) 
When looking for the disposition that guarantees a lifelong abstinence from 
injustice, aversion to blameworthiness is Smith’s preferred candidate: a concern for the true 
value of one’s own character (TMS III.3.4) – by one’s spectatorial standards that is – is 
needed to refrain from injustice in all circumstances. In discussing the necessity of justice for 
society in a Pufendorfian spirit, Smith argues explicitly that mere desire for praise would 
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urge people to fake virtue and hide vice without making them actually ‘fit for society’. What 
can make them truly fit is the desire for praise-worthiness and aversion to blame-worthiness, 
which are equally manifest in our human nature. (III.2.6–7)24 
However, Smith maintains that even given aversion to blame-worthiness 
people are liable to commit an injustice because of momentary lack of or an error in moral 
judgement. He states that in moments of temptation we are not likely to take an impartial 
perspective. Even if one tries, one is likely to imagine that a spectator would approve of 
taking what one wants as perfectly just. Further, in retrospect, one is prone to make distorted 
judgements and come up with justifying considerations in order to avoid the pains of self-
disapprobation. (TMS III.4.3–6, 12) In order to counter the effects of this self-deception, our 
fear of blame-worthiness must take the form of rule-adherence known as a sense of duty. 
Smith explains that resentment of others’ unjust acts and aversion to performing 
the like as well as received blame and regret for one’s own past injustices may result in a 
standing disposition to refrain from certain acts without deliberation (TMS III.4.7). This 
‘sacred regard’ for rules of justice, can prevail even when one’s conscience is silenced or 
distorted by a present passion. Without it, ‘there is no man whose conduct can be much 
depended upon’ for it is the ‘habitual reverence’ for rules that prevents passing inclinations 
from breaking into action. (III.5.2) Whereas it might be impossible to learn to maintain a 
spectator’s perspective on all occasions (III.3.25), some standing regard for the rules of 
justice can be found in anyone whose education has not been ‘very singular’ (III.4.12). Far 
from suggesting that we can always rely on the voice of our conscience, Smith agrees with 
Pufendorf about the practical irreplaceability of habituation.25 
Despite the help gained from rule adherence, we think that Smith’s grim view 
about the pervasiveness of self-deception suggests that desire for and aversion to actual praise 
and blame might be in practice indispensable for avoiding vice and encouraging self-
improvement. If complete self-contentment could always be maintained by following one’s 
conscience, the possibility of going seriously astray would be much greater given our 
propensity for self-deception. This idea is suggested in Smith’s discussion of a wrong sense 
of duty (TMS III.6.12−13) and in his comparison between excessive pride and vanity 
(VI.iii.22−53). It is arguably highly conducive to morality that most of us stand in need of 
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actual approval from others due to the irresistible workings of imagination and the resulting 
sympathies (III.2.28–31). 
 
 
                Conclusion 
 
Pufendorf and Smith have surprisingly similar understandings of human psychology and 
there are striking parallels in the way that they link it to moral conduct. Both hold that being 
esteemed by others is a basic emotional need, as the emotions of resentment and gratitude 
exemplify. Further, the logic of the reactive attitudes informs their respective accounts of 
justice and beneficence. While Pufendorf and Smith ground the relevant norms differently, 
allowing for and fostering people’s self-esteem constitutes their main content. Smith alone 
holds that moral norms arise from passionate human responses, but Pufendorf is no less 
attentive to the natural patterns of evaluating others. Indeed, we suggest that Pufendorf could 
have formulated a sentimentalist theory of morality by combining his Smithian moral 
psychology with his theory of socially imposed moral entities.  
According to Pufendorf, the moral value of actions hinges on the divinely 
imposed duty to cultivate sociability. Nevertheless, he denies that postlapsarian people can 
be relied to respond to the divinely imposed law through their reason. A similar worry 
presents itself for Smith who sees that explaining how people come to judge others in uniform 
ways does not yet explain how people might be motivated to follow the resulting norms 
themselves. In their answers to these worries, both thinkers rely on the desire for esteem. 
Pufendorf argues that in seeking voluntarily imposed esteem, individuals end up behaving 
sociably in their efforts to gain the genuine approval of others. Smith presents a more 
complex view of esteem-related motivations that relies on the workings of the imagination. 
Moral motivation might be grounded in the pleasures and pains of pride and shame, but it 
need not be equated with vanity. 
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Notes 
1 Pufendorf’s works on natural law were a staple of law and philosophy curricula in many 
British and Scottish universities for half a century. See Saunders and Hunter 2003. On the 
influence of Pufendorf’s natural jurisprudence in Scotland, see Haakonssen 1996, 58–62; 
Moore 2006, 291–316.  
2 The main exception is Saastamoinen 1995, 149–158. Heath 2013 is especially helpful about 
the desire for esteem in Smith. Daniel Luban (2012) argues that both the ‘real interest’ in 
Wealth of Nations and the ‘love of domination’ in Lectures of Jurisprudence are historically 
contingent manifestations of the desire for esteem. Luban claims that since Smith takes desire 
for esteem to be the dominant human motive, he comes closer to thinkers like La 
Rochefoucauld, Mandeville, and Rousseau than to a Pufendorfian line of thought. While we 
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find Luban’s reading of Smith convincing we wish to challenge the reading of Pufendorf that 
is used as the contrast.  
3 References to these works will be made according to the abbreviations in the Bibliography 
and Abbreviations and are specified by book, chapter and section. The original language 
version of the text is cited first, separated by a forward-slash from the translation. Our policy 
has been to rely on Michael Seidler’s translation of De jure whenever possible and use the 
Oldfathers’ translation only in passages omitted by Seidler. 
4 The references use the textual divisions employed in the Glasgow edition by Raphael & 
Macfie.  
5 Strawson argues in his classic 1974 essay that the concept of moral responsibility is rooted 
in reactive attitudes, that is, in natural responses towards the good and ill will manifested by 
others. 
6 Pufendorf uses the concept of existimatio to refer to comparative moral quantities among 
people. Unlike Hobbes, who defines the value of persons as ‘price’ (Leviathan 10), Pufendorf 
differentiates the value of persons termed ‘esteem’ (existimatio) from the value (valor) of 
things, which he calls ‘price’ (pretium).  Esteem is ‘the value of persons in communal life 
according to which they can be equated or compared with others, and ranked before or after 
them’ (JNG VIII.4.1/PWSP 253). 
7 Pufendorf notes that simple esteem may be damaged or even entirely lost by various 
unsociable deeds. For instance, pirates and highway robbers lose their esteem entirely (JNG 
VIII.4.5).   
8 Our reading of Pufendorf’s concept of esteem is thus in line with Haakonssen’s 
interpretation (2010, 7–9). This view differs considerably from the kind of proto-Kantian 
interpretations that conceive simple esteem as a right that grounds moral duties. See 
Hruschka 2000, 191–193.  
9 Our reading differs from that of Schneewind (1996, 60), who argues that, for Pufendorf, the 
duties of humanity must be done ‘from an appropriate loving motive’.  
10 According to Pufendorf, from the fact that people ‘appreciate benefits rendered to them, 
and should be grateful for the same’ we should not conclude that they have moral dispositions 
innately and independently of the commands of natural law (JNG I.2.6/LNNO 31). 
11 By sympathy, or fellow feeling, Smith means having an analogous emotion with someone 
due to imagining oneself into that person’s situation (TMS I.i.1.4). The imaginative switch 
of perspective that may result in fellow feeling is something that we do by a natural instinct 
(I.i.4.8). 
12 According to Smith, any particular emotion is approved of as proper with respect to its 
cause when one sympathizes or ‘goes along’ with that emotion (TMS I.i.3.1). Judgements of 
propriety form the basis of further moral evaluations as Smith’s analysis of merit and demerit 
exemplifies. 
13 The main effect of placing the criteria of proper punishment in vicarious resentment results 
from the fact that a spectator’s resentment on behalf of a victim is typically less violent than 
it would be if she herself had been harmed and prompts to a less severe punishment. A society 
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that enforces natural justice through positive law gives vent to this more moderate 
resentment. (TMS II.iii.2.4) 
14 Smith finds this difference in identifying the relevant reactions as the main difference 
between himself and Hume when it comes to accounting for moral thought (TMS 
VII.iii.3.17). 
15 For analyses of Pufendorf’s theory of moral obligation from the perspective of moral 
psychology, see Pink 2009 and Johns 2012. How the internal sense of moral obligation and 
emotional responses to social experience are related to one another as motivational sources 
is outside the scope of this paper.  
16 For the constructive role of passions as a source of motivation for the promotion of 
sociability, see Haara 2016.  
17 Pufendorf does not hold a philosophical position known as psychological egoism. In some 
instances, a person may be motivated to act by generosity or pity for another’s condition. 
(JNG III.3.15). See also JNG II.3.14/PWP 151 where Pufendorf notes that, when reflecting 
man’s natural condition, he has prioritized self-love, ‘because man, being naturally aware of 
his own existence before that of others, naturally loves himself before he cares for them’. 
18 For Hobbes’s concept of glory, see especially Slomp 2000. 
19 According to Hobbes, ‘THE POWER of a man, to take it universally, is his present means 
to obtain some future apparent good’ (Hobbes 2012, 132). Note that, in this context, by power 
(potentia) Pufendorf means natural power, not moral power (potestas).   
20 Haakonssen (2003, 211–213) claims that virtuous motives – and in fact all properly human 
action – is ‘artificial’ according to Smith in the sense that one does not count as a moral agent 
without having a spectator’s perspective towards oneself, acquired through social interaction. 
We agree that people regularly condition their passions through spontaneously imagining 
how they and their situation would appear to others. Hence, action often results from a 
mixture of natural passion regulated imperceptibly by passions of others, their moral 
sentiments included. (TMS I.i.4.8–9; III.3.23) In this paper, we define moral motivation more 
narrowly and do not deny that natural passions might be socially conditioned. 
21 Smith disagrees here with his teacher Francis Hutcheson, who maintains that natural 
benevolence is strong enough if it is not counteracted by mistaken views of interest (Inquiry, 
179). 
22 Smith repeatedly highlights the importance of pride and shame in determining human 
happiness. See also TMS I.iii.2.12 and II.ii.2.4. 
23 While Smith insists that all three desires are distinct, he acknowledges that they are 
‘connected, and often blended with one another’ and that there is an ‘affinity’ between them 
(TMS III.2.2, 26). Our suggestion is that the affinity is that they all display the human need 
to sustain pride and avoid shame. 
24 Our discussion is limited to the ways that praise-related desires make people strive for 
virtue. Smith, like Pufendorf, does recognize that they lead to various other endeavours as 
well. For example, Smith argues that desire for approbation leads us to pursue wealth and 
status and is manifest in the pride we take in them (TMS I.iii.2).  
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25 Smith points out that without a sense of duty we would constantly violate all sorts of moral 
norms that we approve of in our ‘cool hours’, ranging from mere politeness to justice. In 
connection with the rules of justice, then, a sense of duty becomes necessary for the ‘very 
existence of society’ (TMS III.5.2).  
